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James D. Ridgway 
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ABSTRACT 
Veterans benefits are a creature of statute. As such, nearly every veterans benefits 
issue presented to the courts for resolution involves the interpretation of a statute, 
regulation, or sub-regulatory authority. Although veterans law has been subject to 
judicial review for over twenty-five years, the courts still have yet to develop a 
coherent doctrine regarding when to resolve ambiguity in favor of the veteran versus 
when to defer to the interpretations of the Department of Veterans Affairs. 
This Article explores three possible approaches to developing a coherent vision of 
how veteran friendliness and agency deference can coexist and provide more 
predictability in how to interpret veterans benefits laws. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“There are places in law through which a pair of 
mutually oblivious doctrines run in infinitely parallel 
contrariety, like a pair of poolhall scoring racks on one 
or the other of which, seemingly at random, cases get 
hung up.”1 
eterans benefits are a creature of statute.2 As such, nearly every 
veterans benefits issue presented to the courts for resolution 
involves the interpretation of a statute, regulation, or sub-regulatory 
authority.3 To resolve these issues, the courts use a pair of legal 
toolboxes.4 One box holds a collection of tools that require ambiguity 
to be resolved in favor of the veteran.5 The other box contains tools 
that require deference to the interpretations of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA), which administers the benefits paid under Title 
38 of the United States Code.6 Although veterans law has been subject 
to judicial review for over twenty-five years, the courts still have yet to 
develop a coherent doctrine regarding when to draw from which box.7 
                                                 
1 Tony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PENN. L. REV. 67, 67 (1960). 
2 See generally Veterans Benefits, 38 U.S.C. Pt. II (2014) (chapters 11, 13, 15, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 24 cover veterans benefits under Part II). 
3 See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2002). 
4 Of course, these toolboxes are not the exclusive tools available to the courts. 
The number of available canons is quite lengthy. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term: Foreword, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 97 app. (1994) (The Rehnquist Court’s Canons of Statutory 
Construction) (listing over 100 canons of statutory construction applied by the 
Supreme Court from 1986 to 1993). 
5 Id. 
6 See Veterans Benefits, 38 U.S.C. pt. II (2014). 
7 Veteran friendliness is not the only principle that courts struggle to reconcile 
with agency deference. Compare Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 
534 (4th Cir. 2005) (deferring to agency’s interpretation of statute with criminal 
penalties), with Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 730 (6th Cir. 
2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (arguing the rule of lenity trumps deference and, 
therefore, “a court should not defer to an agency’s anti-defendant interpretation 
of a law backed by criminal penalties.”). There has also been some confusion as 
to how agency deference interacts with the presumption against federal 
preemption of state law. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 737, 739–40 (2004). 
V 
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Each set of tools tends to be phrased as mandatory default rules and 
overriding principles, rather than general concerns subject to 
countervailing considerations. Instead of trying to reconcile the 
coexistence of seemingly contradictory principles about how to resolve 
ambiguity, the courts persistently avoid the tension between the 
toolsets by just applying one or the other, without discussing their 
interaction.8 
This Article suggests that resolving the tension between the 
principles of agency deference and veteran friendliness will require 
developing a sophisticated framework that recognizes the truth that 
both ideas serve a role. In particular, there are approaches to this 
fundamental tension of veterans law that make the canons less 
adversarial and more cooperative, while also improving the 
functionality of the benefits system. These canons poorly serve 
veterans when used merely as window dressings, rather than the basis 
of thoughtful analysis of how to provide the best possible benefits 
system for veterans.9 Although judicial review has improved the 
outcomes of benefits decisions for veterans, it has also increased the 
complexity of the law, which has caused a host of problems.10 
This Article explores three possible approaches to developing a 
coherent vision of how veteran friendliness and agency deference can 
coexist and provide more predictability in how to interpret veterans 
benefits laws.11 First, this Article briefly reviews some evidence that 
illustrates problems from the past five years of case law. Next, it 
                                                 
8 See infra notes 24–25, 60–61 and accompanying text. 
9 A leading commentator on veterans law has asserted that the CAVC has 
struggled with its law-giving function. See Michael P. Allen, The United States 
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims Significant Developments (2004-2006) 
and What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 
483, 514–22 (2007). To the extent that this is true, it may well be explained by 
the court’s inability to make progress in reconciling the two doctrines that lie at 
the heart of its law-giving role in reviewing veterans claims. 
10 See James D. Ridgway, The Veterans Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later: 
Confronting the New Complexities of VA Adjudication, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 251, 265–71 (2010) [hereinafter Ridgway, The Veterans Judicial Review 
Act]. 
11 Not everyone would agree that certainty in the courts’ use of interpretive 
principles is always positive. See Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 1349, 1372–82 (2013) (using game theory to argue that there are some 
benefits to having uncertainty as to the deference level to be applied). 
392 UMass Law Review v. 9 | 388 
explores the origins of the two canons for detailed guidance on the role 
of the courts in veterans law. Based upon that foundation, the next 
section reflects on some philosophical considerations that should guide 
the reconciliation of the two canons. Finally, Section V suggests three 
specific approaches to resolve the tension between veteran friendliness 
and agency deference that may prove to be fruitful stepping stones in 
evolving a sophisticated understanding of how the canons can work 
together to best serve veterans. Judicial review will never be as non-
adversarial as the agency adjudication process, but the system as a 
whole would benefit from thinking about the key canons of review in a 
less adversarial manner.12 
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CANONS 
The heart and soul of veterans law is the relationship between two 
principles: veteran friendliness and agency deference. The principle of 
veteran friendliness suggests that the administrative system operated 
by VA should be navigable without assistance and produce generous 
outcomes.13 The principle of agency deference suggests that courts 
should defer to VA in reviewing the system that the agency 
administers.14 Both of these principles have multiple facets, and, so 
far, the courts have been unable to develop a framework for their 
interaction. Instead, the courts studiously ignore the problem.15 
Until the courts squarely confront the tension between veteran 
friendliness and agency deference, scholars must examine the canons 
more closely to take the first step in finding a satisfactory resolution. A 
more nuanced view is crucial because the simplified versions of the 
canons cannot coexist.16 In other areas of the law, canons each have 
                                                 
12 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, at 13–14 (1988); see also Michael P. Allen, Due 
Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitution Can Tell us About the 
Veterans Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 507–08 (2011). 
13 James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices in a Familiar Conversation About Rules 
vs. Standards: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2011, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 
1175, 1186–90 (2012) [hereinafter Ridgway, Changing Voices]. 
14 Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1379–82 (2013). 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 In fact, Justice Scalia gave the keynote address to the CAVC’s 2013 Judicial 
Conference, and “told the judicial conference attendees that he believes that 
Chevron and Gardner cannot coexist.” See Justice Scalia Headlines the Twelfth 
CAVC Judicial Conference, VETERANS L.J. 1 (summer 2013), available at 
http://www.cavcbar.net/Summer%202013%20VLJ%20Web.pdf. 
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their own sphere of control and sometimes clash in borderline cases.17 
However, the shorthand versions of veteran friendliness and agency 
deference both purport to explain how ambiguity is resolved,18 and 
therefore compete for the same sphere of control. Accordingly, a brief 
survey of their origins is warranted before attempting to harmonize the 
doctrines. 
A. The Origins of Veteran Friendliness 
1. Gardner 
Brown v. Gardner19 and Hodge v. West20 are the two primary cases 
that embody the principle of veteran friendliness. Gardner was the 
first veterans benefits case reviewed by the Supreme Court after the 
Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988 (VJRA)21 made such claims 
subject to review. The question presented in Gardner was whether a 
veteran injured by VA hospital care had to prove negligence or similar 
fault in order to receive benefits.22 In Gardner, the Court noted that, 
even if the language of the benefits statute at issue were not clear, it 
might apply “the rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the 
veteran’s favor.”23 In other words, ambiguity in a veterans benefits 
statute should be resolved in the veteran’s favor. 
This holding drew from a series of cases that predate the Veterans 
Judicial Review Act, in which the Supreme Court reviewed statutes 
that provided benefits to veterans outside of the claims process. 
Specifically, the principle traces to a World War II-era case, Boone v. 
Lightner,24 in which the Court ruled against a soldier seeking special 
treatment under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940.25 
                                                 
17 See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and 
the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 112 (2005). 
18 James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1186. 
19 513 U.S. 115 (1994). 
20 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
21 Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). 
22 513 U.S. at 116. 
23 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). 
24 319 U.S. 561 (1943). See Linda Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: 
Reconciling Brown v. Gardner’s Presumption that Interpretive Doubt Be 
Resolved in Veterans Favor with Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 66–70 (2011) 
(tracing the doctrine to Boone) [hereinafter Jellum, Heads I Win]. 
25 Boone, 319 at 575. 
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The Court remarked at the end of the opinion that the Act “is always to 
be liberally construed to protect those who have been obliged to drop 
their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation.”26 
Since deciding Gardner, the Court’s remark has become one the 
defining cases of veterans law, and citations to it are ubiquitous. 
Unfortunately, neither the case law that precedes it nor those cases that 
apply it provide much guidance as to its contours. Even so, one analyst 
commented, “Gardner’s Presumption [has] morphed from a simple 
directive to courts to construe veterans benefits statutes liberally into a 
veterans’ trump card in which . . . VA always loses the interpretive 
battle.”27 Accordingly, it is easy to see why courts often find it difficult 
to discuss agency deference when invoking Gardner. 
2. Hodge 
Gardner is not the only facet of the canon of veteran friendliness. 
Not every case involves statutory interpretation, and veteran 
friendliness has become a broader principle than that announced in that 
case. The other key aspect of veteran-friendly interpretation is the 
sympathetic-reading doctrine.28 The doctrine is somewhat amorphous, 
but its essence is that veterans benefits procedures and submissions by 
claimants pursuant to those procedures should be interpreted to 
maximize the theories of entitlement at issue and minimize denials 
based upon technical grounds. 
This principle’s origins are murkier than the Gardner 
presumption.29 Citations to case law invariably trace the doctrine’s 
origins to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hodge. On this point, 
Hodge is a curious decision. As with Gardner and Boone, the portion 
of Hodge that enunciates this principle is structured as an afterthought, 
rather than actually controlling the outcome.30 The issue in Hodge was 
                                                 
26 Id. Although the principle resembles the remedial purposes doctrine, see Jellum, 
Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 67, the Court has never linked the two, and 
history may better explain the origins of this doctrine than the law. See infra 
notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
27 Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 121. Justice Scalia has publicly 
commented that, “‘in practice, [the presumption] may be more like a fist [on the 
scales] than a thumb, as it should be.’” Scalia Headlines, supra note 59. 
28 John Fussell & Jonathan Hager, The Evolution of the Pending Claim Doctrine, 2 
VETERANS L. REV. 145, 157 (2010). 
29 Id. at 181. 
30 See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d at 1363. 
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the interpretation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which deals with “whether 
proffered evidence is sufficiently ‘new and material’ such that a 
veteran’s claim for service-connected disability benefits must be 
reopened.”31 Like Gardner, the opinion resolved the main issue on 
other grounds. The Federal Circuit held that the CAVC had failed to 
give Chevron deference to the agency’s regulation.32 It then proceeded 
to discuss a rule of veteran-friendly interpretation only as a tool that 
the Federal Circuit would invoke had it been necessary.33 
In this regard, the analysis in Hodge is particularly unusual. The 
court added that the CAVC had “imposed on veterans a requirement 
inconsistent with the general character of the underlying statutory 
scheme for awarding veterans’ benefits.”34 The central support for this 
conclusion was an extensive quotation from the legislative history of 
the VJRA: “I[m]plicit in such a beneficial system has been an 
evolution of a completely ex-parte system of adjudication in which 
Congress expects [the DVA] to fully and sympathetically develop the 
veteran’s claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits.”35 
Numerous cases have used the above quotation, and variations thereof, 
since.36 
As with Gardner, the origins of Hodge do not provide much 
guidance as to its precise scope. The description in Hodge certainly 
captures the ideal vision of a non-adversarial, paternalistic system. 
However, placing Hodge in the hierarchy of interpretive principles is 
tricky. The net result of invoking Hodge is that courts use the 
legislative history of the VJRA to interpret statutes and regulations 
enacted both long before and after that legislation passed into law. It is 
simply not clear how much strength such legislative history should 
                                                 
31 Id. at 1357. 
32 This holding by the CAVC failing to give deference to the agency’s 
interpretation of the regulation is curious by itself, because the agency was 
defending the CAVC’s interpretation of the regulation. Hodge was decided more 
than a year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
(1997), which held that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is 
entitled to the highest deference, but Hodge makes no mention of the extra 
deference owed to an agency in interpreting its own regulations. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1362. 
35 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5795) (altered text as appeared in the original). 
36 See generally Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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have in interpreting authorities beyond the statute at issue. 
Nonetheless, courts also use the ruling as something of a “trump 
card.”37 For example, in one application of Hodge, the Federal Circuit 
characterized its rule as follows: “The government’s interest in 
veterans cases is not that [veterans] shall win, but rather that justice 
shall be done, that all veterans so entitled receive the benefits due to 
them.”38 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has castigated the government for 
advancing interpretations that the court views as “a trap for the 
unwary, or a stratagem to deny compensation to a veteran who has a 
valid claim, but who may be unaware of the various forms of 
compensation available to him.”39 Accordingly, Hodge and the 
sympathetic-reading doctrine are also hard to reconcile with agency 
deference. 
B. Agency Deference 
On the other side of the coin, there is well-established court 
deference to agencies as to their reasonable interpretations of the the 
authorities that define the system that the agency administers. The 
seminal case cited for this point is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Counsel, Inc.,40 which held that courts should defer 
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statutes it administers.41 
The precise contours of Chevron and the deference owed to 
agencies is a topic that has been extensively examined elsewhere,42 
and only a few highlights are noted here. Prior to Chevron, under 
Skidmore v. Swift & Company,43 the Court gave agencies deference to 
their opinions as “a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”44 
                                                 
37 See Barrett v. Nicholson, 466 F.3d 1038, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
38 Id. (emphasis added). 
39 Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
40 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
41 Id. at 844. 
42 See, e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from 
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Ann Graham, Searching for 
Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency 
Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
43 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
44 Id. at 140. 
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However, Chevron in large part replaced the expertise rationale with 
one of democratic accountability.45 In this conception, courts avoid 
making policy because they have neither the expertise of agencies nor 
the accountability of the political branches.46 
The judicial modesty required by Chevron was initially expanded 
in cases such as Auer v. Robbins,47 which reinforced that an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation was entitled to deference unless 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.48 However, the 
initial clarity of Chevron has since given way to doubt in light of 
decisions such as Christensen v. Harris County49 and United States v. 
Mead Corporation.50 Both cases indicated that, regardless of the 
overarching institutional concerns, Chevron deference sometimes does 
not apply.51 Moreover, Justice Scalia—the staunchest defender of 
Chevron—has recently backed off from his commitment to Auer 
deference, leaving the framework further muddled.52 
In surveying this landscape, Professor Cass Sunstein asserted that 
the Supreme Court decisions have created “a significant increase in 
uncertainty about the appropriate approach [to deference]. More than 
at any time in recent years, a threshold question—the scope of judicial 
review—has become one of the most vexing in regulatory cases.”53 
Accordingly, discerning a complete and satisfactory theory of agency 
deference doctrines in current case law is as unrealistic as searching 
                                                 
45 ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
WRIT SMALL 155 (2007). 
46 “Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of 
government.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
47 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
48 Id. 
49 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
50 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
51 See Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims: 
Has it Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 67, 87–97 (2011) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s post-Chevron case law) [hereinafter Jellum, 
CAVC]. 
52 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[H]owever great may be the 
efficiency gains derived from Auer deference, beneficial effect cannot justify a 
rule that not only has no principled basis but contravenes one of the great rules 
of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”). 
53 Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 42, at 190. 
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for a similar theory of veteran friendliness. Nonetheless, there is no 
question that agency deference is a deeply held canon of judicial 
review, and is currently founded on concepts of democratic 
accountability and agency expertise. 
III. THE CANONS AT THE COURTS 
In theory, it should be very hard for the courts to avoid the tension 
between the canons of veteran friendliness and agency deference. 
Once a court finds ambiguity in a veterans benefits statute, it must 
apply a rule to resolve that ambiguity when the agency and the 
claimant are at odds.54 In their simplest forms, each of the competing 
doctrines states how ambiguity should be resolved in veterans law 
cases, and each doctrine typically points to opposite outcomes in cases 
in which the claimant and the VA Secretary are at odds.55 
Accordingly, there should be a myriad of cases in which courts discuss 
and resolve these competing arguments. In reality, there are not. 
A search of the last five years of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit veterans law cases yields only four decisions 
mentioning both Gardner and Chevron.56 During the same five years, 
the court issued thirteen opinions mentioning either Gardner or 
Chevron, but not the other.57 Moreover, none of the four cases that 
discusses both precedents comes close to articulating a coherent vision 
of the relationship between Gardner and Chevron. 
First, in Nielson v. Shinseki,58 the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he 
mere fact that the particular words of the statute . . . standing alone 
might be ambiguous does not compel us to resort to the [Gardner] 
canon. Rather, that canon is only applicable after other interpretive 
guidelines have been exhausted, including Chevron.”59 However, the 
                                                 
54 Compare Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994), with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Nat. Resources Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
55 Id. 
56 The Westlaw search was “advanced: chevron & gardner & DA(aft 1-21-2009) & 
TI(shinseki).” The chosen date of January 21, 2009, coincides with the 
confirmation of Eric K. Shinseki as Secretary of Veterans Affairs. 
57 The Westlaw searches were “advanced: gardner & DA(aft 01-21-2009) & 
TI(shinseki) % chevron” (producing ten results) and “advanced: chevron & 
DA(aft 01-21-2009) & TI(shinseki) % gardner” (producing four results). 
58 607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
59 Id at 808. 
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court relied primarily on the ejusdem generis canon,60 and concluded 
that the statute at issue was not ambiguous when applying the 
applicable canons in toto.61 
The subsequent case of Guerra v. Shinseki illustrates the avoidance 
seen in many court decisions. Guerra is a divided Federal Circuit 
panel opinion in which the majority applied Chevron deference to 
resolve the case against the veteran, without mentioning Gardner.62 
However, the dissent argued that Chevron deference was inappropriate 
because the language of the statute clearly commanded the opposition 
conclusion.63 The dissent argued that, in the alternative, “the majority 
also ignores the canon of statutory construction that requires 
ambiguities, if any, in veterans statutes to be resolved in favor of the 
veteran.”64 However, there is no discussion in the dissent as to why 
Gardner should trump Chevron in general, or in the case that was at 
hand.65 
In the third Federal Circuit case, Heino v. Shinseki,66 the court 
conducted a straight Chevron analysis and ruled against the veteran.67 
However, the court stated in a footnote: 
                                                 
60 Id. at 806–07. The ejusdem generis canon states that when an authority contains 
a list of examples, it only applies to items similar to the kinds listed. 
61 Id. at 808. 
62 Guerra v. Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 1795 (2012). 
63 Id. at 1052 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. 
65 The dialogue between the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims shows additional avoidance. For example, Frederick v. Shinseki held that 
the plain language of the statutes favored the veterans, but the Federal Circuit 
reversed, holding that the plain language supported the Secretary’s 
interpretation. See 24 Vet. App. 335, 341 (2011), rev’d, 684 F.3d 1263, 1270 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1634 (2013). 
66 683 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Frederick is also remarkable because Judge 
Reyna dissented at the Federal Circuit and agreed with the CAVC panel that the 
plain language favored the veteran. Frederick v. Shinseki, 684 F.3d 1263, 1274 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Reyna, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1634 (2013). 
Therefore, the Secretary prevailed even though four of the six appellate judges 
who reviewed the case interpreted the statute in favor of the veteran. Notably, 
Judge Reyna remarked that he would have applied Gardner to resolve ambiguity 
in the veteran’s favor had he found the statute ambiguous. Id. at 1275 (Reyna, J., 
dissenting). He made no mention of deference to the Secretary. Id. (Reyna, J., 
dissenting). 
67 Id. at 1375–77. 
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It is not clear where the [Gardner] canon fits within the Chevron 
doctrine, or whether it should be part of the Chevron analysis at all. 
Compare Nielson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 802, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(stating that the [Gardner] canon ‘is only applicable after other 
interpretive guidelines have been exhausted, including Chevron’), 
with Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 692, 694 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the [Gardner] canon ‘modif[ies] the 
traditional Chevron analysis’).68 
After this bout of honesty, the court rejected the idea of applying 
Gardner by stating, “[W]e will not hold a statute unambiguous by 
resorting to a tool of statutory construction used to analyze ambiguous 
statutes.”69 This suggests the court viewed Gardner as a rule that 
applies to the question of the existence of ambiguity, before reaching 
the question of deference. 
Perhaps the most telling part of Heino is Judge Plager’s 
concurrence, in which he candidly described the decision as follows: 
With a creative bit of definitional construction and Chevron 
analysis, we conclude that what . . . VA does is legitimate; this 
avoids throwing . . . the VA co-payment system into total chaos, 
and probably is, in a broad sense, consistent with what Congress 
thought . . . VA should be doing.70 
Accordingly, he suggested an approach that is more practical than 
rigidly doctrinal. 
Finally, in Burden v. Shinseki,71 the court cited Chevron for the 
step one principle that courts must give effect to the plain language of 
the statute, and then never mentioned it again.72 As for Gardner, the 
Burden court noted three pages later in its decision that there was no 
particularly “veteran friendly” way to resolve a dispute between two 
widows who were both claiming to be the surviving spouse of the 
veteran.73 Ultimately, the court relied on the plain language of the 
statute, and said nothing about the competing canons.74 
                                                 
68 Id. at 1379 n.8. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1382 (Plager, J., concurring). 
71 727 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
72 Id. at 1166. 
73 Id. at 1169. 
74 Id. at 1171–72. 
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These five years of cases cannot be easily reconciled. Nielson 
suggests that Gardner simply would not apply if there were a 
regulation requiring Chevron deference.75 On the other hand, Heino 
suggests that Gardner applies to the question of ambiguity before 
considering deference.76 Meanwhile, Guerra shows that the court is so 
uncomfortable with the tension between the canons that they are loath 
to admit ambiguity, even when the judges involved in a case have 
diametrically opposite views of the plain meaning of the language.77 
Instead, in the overwhelming majority of cases from the Federal 
Circuit, the court prefers to avoid the problem by discussing only one 
canon at a time. As it stands, the most illuminating opinions may be 
Burden and Judge Plager’s concurrence in Heino, which appear to 
avoid taking the canons at face value, but peek behind the curtain to 
consider the larger system in choosing which canon to apply. 
The opinions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) 
from the same period echo the same disparities as those of the Federal 
Circuit. Sometimes, the CAVC mentions both canons but applies 
neither, because it concludes that the statute is clear on its face.78 At 
other times, it concludes that both Gardner and Chevron support its 
conclusion.79 Opinions such as Sharp v. Shinseki80 reject the 
Secretary’s claim of deference under Chevron, and apply Gardner to 
rule in favor of the veteran;81 however, opinions such as Meedel v. 
Shinseki82 apply agency deference with only a passing mention of 
Gardner at the beginning of the analysis.83 The CAVC even has 
opinions similar to Guerra, such as Breniser v. Shinseki,84 in which the 
majority applied Chevron85 while the dissent invoked Gardner.86 
                                                 
75 Nielson, 607 F. 3d at 808. 
76 Heino, 683 F.3d at 1379 n.8. 
77 Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1049–52. 
78 See, e.g., Nielson, 23 Vet. App. at 60–61. 
79 See, e.g., Wingard v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 334, 346–47 (2013); Mason v. 
Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 1, 8–9 (2012). 
80 23 Vet. App. 267 (2009). 
81 Id. at 275–76; see also Trafter v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 267 (2013). 
82 23 Vet. App. 277 (2009). 
83 Id. at 282–83; see also Wanless v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 143, 150 (2009). 
84 25 Vet. App. 64 (2011). 
85 Id. at 75. 
86 Id. at 81 (Kasold, C.J., dissenting). 
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Overall, the application of the canons at the CAVC is no more 
consistent than it is at the Federal Circuit. 
The story told by the numbers at the CAVC is also similar. Over 
the same past five-year period, the CAVC issued thirteen precedential 
opinions that mention both Gardner and Chevron, including the seven 
cited in the previous paragraph.87 However, during that same time it 
also issued forty-six opinions that mentioned Gardner but not 
Chevron,88 and ten more opinions that mentioned Chevron but not 
Gardner.89 Like its reviewing court, therefore, the CAVC also has the 
overwhelming tendency to discuss only one canon at a time. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court may have to resolve the tension, but 
so far it has not accepted an opportunity to do so.90 Since the Gardner 
decision in 1994—which mentioned only the first step of Chevron—
the Court has reviewed three more Federal Circuit decisions 
originating from the CAVC.91 However, one of those decisions 
involved the Equal Access to Justice Act,92 and the other two involved 
the CAVC’s organic act.93 Therefore, a situation has not yet been 
presented to the Supreme Court in which deference might be owed to 
VA in its interpretation of Title 38. 
                                                 
87 The search done on Westlaw was “advanced: gardner & chevron & DA(aft 01-
21-2009) % unpublished.” “Shinseki” was not needed as a limiting term to 
search CAVC cases because the Secretary is a party to every case at the CAVC. 
88 The search was “advanced: gardner & DA(aft 01-21-2009) % chevron % 
unpublished.” 
89 The search was “advanced: chevron & DA(aft 01-21-2009) % gardner % 
unpublished.” 
90 As the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review CAVC decisions, it is 
not possible for a circuit split to develop. Moreover, as discussed above, the 
Federal Circuit has tended to avoid addressing the tension directly, rather than 
teeing it up for resolution by presenting a definitive, in-depth ruling. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the issue has not been accepted for review 
by the Supreme Court. 
91 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1211–13 
(2011). 
92 See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004). 
93 See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011); Sanders v. 
Shinseki, 556 U.S. 396 (2009). 
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IV. GARDNER, CHEVRON, AND THE TENSION BETWEEN FACT- AND 
VALUE-BASED JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Given that both veteran friendliness and agency deference lack 
cohesive borders on their own, it may seem impossible to reconcile the 
two canons. However, it is imperative to explore the possibility. At the 
very least, it may be possible to make progress toward harmonizing the 
two competing views. Indeed, the lingering malleability in both 
doctrines may well provide the flexibility to find a compromise in 
aligning the competing spheres of control. Almost certainly, a 
workable approach to the doctrines exists that is less adversarial and 
more productive than those currently recognized. 
One place to begin is to look abstractly at what the canons might 
represent. There is “a spectrum between fact- and value-based canons 
of interpretation.”94 Fact-based canons seek to discern what the 
original policy maker would have said if it had spoken more clearly to 
the problem at hand, while value-based canons give authority to the 
courts to protect certain values regardless of the original intent of the 
policy at hand.95 In other words, some canons seek to implement the 
decisions of the political branches as faithfully as possible, while 
others tend to protect specified values against the tendency of those 
same branches to sacrifice values when expedient or unpopular.96 
Therefore, we can begin the exploration process by recognizing that 
how one resolves the tension between veteran-friendliness and agency 
deference depends a lot on whether one views the role of the courts as 
protecting the value of veteran friendliness or as ensuring that the 
agency remains true to democratically made policy decisions. 
Looking at the value side of the coin, the question of how much the 
courts should defer to the democratic branches on veterans policy is 
key because the nation has a decidedly checkered history of caring for 
its veterans, one that extends far beyond the negative experiences of 
the Vietnam generation.97 As mentioned above, the principle of 
                                                 
94 See Thomas B. Bennett, Note, The Canon at the Water’s Edge, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 207, 212 (2012). 
95 Id. 
96 See generally id. at 246. 
97 See generally James D. Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the 
History of Veterans Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135 
(2011) [hereinafter Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited]. 
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veteran-friendly interpretation traces to Boone.98 Three of the justices 
on the Supreme Court at that time were World War I veterans, and a 
fourth had been a War Department official.99 They had front-row 
seats100 a decade earlier to the Bonus Army fiasco, where the U.S. 
Army used bayonets, tanks, and tear gas to drive tens of thousands of 
peacefully protesting veterans from the National Mall.101 There is a 
very plausible interpretation that Boone/Gardner is, at its heart, a 
value-based canon created by veteran-justices, who had seen first-hand 
how badly treated some veterans were when petitioning for redress of 
their grievances.102 Therefore, a value-based approach may well lead 
to an active role for the courts, typified more recently by the language 
in Barrett and Cromer.103 
                                                 
98 See Boone, 319 U.S. at 575. 
99 See generally SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, CONG. RES. SERV., R40802, SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, PROFESSIONAL 
EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 1789-2010, 25–27 (2010); Benjamin H. 
Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment 
Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1160–61 (2012). When Boone was decided 
in 1943, the Court included WWI veterans Justices Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, 
and Frank Murphy. See Andrew Cohen, None of the Supreme Court Justices 
Has Battle Experience, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/none-of-the-supreme-
court-justices-has-battle-experience/260973/. Furthermore, “Harlan Stone 
(1941–1946) served on a War Department Board of Inquiry.” Id. 
100 Before completion of the Supreme Court building in 1935, the Supreme Court 
met in the “Old Senate Chamber” of the U.S. Capitol. See The Court Building, 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov
/about/courtbuilding.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). 
101 See Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited, supra note 97, at 176–78. See 
generally PAUL DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN 
AMERICAN EPIC (2004). 
102 This may also explain why the Gardner canon has maintained its distance from 
the remedial purpose canon. Although the two have been compared to each 
other, see Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 67, the Court usually describes 
the remedial purpose canon as a fact-based canon in which the courts are trying 
to promote Congress’ remedial intent, rather than a value-based canon in which 
courts take statutes as licenses to resist the democratic process. See N.E. Marine 
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) (concluding that the broad 
language of a remedial statute indicates that the Court should interpret it 
expansively); Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953) (stating that the statute 
should be liberally interpreted to achieve the result intended by Congress). 
103 Another manifestation of this pro-veteran sentiment is observable in the efforts 
to apply due process to the current problem of the claims processing backlog. 
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The opposite side of the coin—the side concerned with faithfully 
executing democratic decisions regardless of policy—aligns clearly 
with the essential notion of Chevron. Here, courts should defer to the 
democratic will of the political branches and the expertise of the 
agencies charged with administering their directions.104 The fact-based 
approach (attempting to faithfully discern and implement the decisions 
of the democratic branches) raises difficult questions of the types of 
intent to attribute to Congress and the Secretary in interpreting the 
authorities they have drafted. The problems of the veterans benefits 
system are complex, and it is often very difficult to predict the effect 
of systemic decisions before implementation.105 In such an 
environment, it is very hard to judge intent based upon results.106 Good 
intentions will sometimes nonetheless lead to bad outcomes, and the 
general rule of deference is that agencies and Congress must correct 
their own mistakes.107 Even if courts were to explicitly adopt an 
approach that it is the general intent of the democratic branches that 
the system function well, Chevron is explicitly based upon the notion 
that courts lack the institutional competence to make better decisions 
than the political branches about what policies would achieve the 
desired functioning.108 
This is not to say that a fact-based approach leaves little role for 
courts. There is no consensus as to whether Congress would generally 
intend for ambiguity to be resolved by agencies or by the courts.109 
Moreover, the insulation of courts from political pressures allows them 
                                                                                                                   
See James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The 
Problem of Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing 
by Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57 (2012) [hereinafter Ridgway, 
Equitable Power]. 
104 Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1863 (2013). 
105 See Ridgway, The Veterans Judicial Review Act, supra note 10, at 296–98 
(2010). 
106 Id. at 297–98. 
107 See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238 (2001) (“We think, in sum, that . . . 
efforts to simplify ultimately run afoul of Congress’s indications that different 
statutes present different reasons for considering respect for the exercise of 
administrative authority or deference to it.”). 
108 See id.; see also generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
109 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional 
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2050 (2011) (arguing that the assumption that 
Congress intends to delegate interpretative authority to agencies is “both false 
and fraudulent”). 
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to examine problems with the system honestly, while the political 
branches face strong incentives to gloss over them.110 Therefore, a 
fact-based approach to the canon may take a very sophisticated view 
of the role of the courts if they treat the political branches and the 
agency, realistically, as imperfect actors.111 
Overall, the distinction between a value-based review and fact-
based review helps explain a lot of the tension between the canons of 
veteran friendliness and agency deference.112 Before leaving this 
thought, it is important to note that the relationship between the two 
views may be further complicated in practice. A value-based approach 
to review will not necessarily lead to different outcomes than a fact-
based review, because the intents of the political branches and the 
agency often align with the value of veteran friendliness.113 
Nevertheless, the foundations of veterans law were based on a 
statutory scheme that was explicitly intended to roll back benefits,114 
but countless modifications to the system since then were motivated by 
a much more compassionate approach to veterans.115 Accordingly, 
there has been substantial variance over time in the motivations of the 
                                                 
110 See Ridgway, Equitable Power, supra note 103, at 130–31 (discussing how 
public choice theory predicts that the incentives of politicians and agency 
administrators will often be at odds with the sound execution of an agency’s 
mission). 
111 See David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of 
Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2213–14 (2010). In this 
regard, the choice between fact- and value-based review is another manifestation 
of the classic problem of how to determine when courts should be majoritarian 
versus counter-majoritarian. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986); Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian 
Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 283 (2010); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881 (1991). 
112 However, it is not the only way to recast this tension. For example, it is possible 
to perceive the debate as a version of rules-versus-standards. See Ridgway, 
Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1183–86 (2012). 
113 James D. Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues: Veterans Law at the 
Federal Circuit in 2012, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1037, 1087 (2013) [hereinafter 
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues]. 
114 James D. Ridgway, Recovering an Institutional Memory: The Origins of the 
Modern Veterans Benefits System, 1914 to 1958, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 1, 7 
(2013). 
115 Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1087. 
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drafters of veterans law.116 The way courts approach the relationship 
between veteran friendliness and agency deference may depend upon 
the drafting date of the authority. Arguably, when veteran friendliness 
clearly motivated the agency in making a difficult judgment call, 
courts have less reason to aggressively invoke value-based review.117 
V. TOWARD A LESS ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP 
Ultimately, distilling any practical guidance requires a synthesis of 
the competing canons of veteran friendliness and agency deference. 
Below are three alternative approaches that might serve to move the 
doctrinal development forward. Individually, each may be flawed and 
insufficient. Nonetheless, the evolution toward a more sophisticated 
and workable approach necessarily begins with such stepping-stones. 
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive.118 Indeed, they 
each focus on a different relationship, and therefore might coexist, at 
least uneasily, while selective pressures of case-by-case decision 
making work to fashion a more holistic theory.119 The first approach 
focuses on the relationship between VA and the courts, and seeks to 
rearticulate and clarify the canons and their respective roles.120 The 
second approach focuses on the relationship between VA and 
Congress, and suggests that the weight of the two canons may vary 
depending upon the type of issue presented.121 Finally, the third 
approach focuses on the relationship between the courts and the 
advocates in veterans benefits cases, and suggests that the courts may 
use the canons to extract better information from advocates before 
deciding an issue.122 
                                                 
116 Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane? Citizenship, Gender, and 
Social Policy in the Post War Era, 9 MICH J. GENDER & L. 91, 120 (2002); 
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1087. 
117 See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1186–89. 
118 Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues, supra note 113, at 1075–76; see also 
Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 88–102. 
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A. The Canons and Congressional Delegations 
One logical starting place to look for common ground is at the 
intersection of the canons’ conceptions, both of which are often treated 
as presumptions of congressional intent.123 On the one hand, the 
Supreme Court decided Boone and Hodge based upon the premise that 
Congress, knowing that it cannot resolve all issues ex ante, created the 
system with a residual intent that ambiguity be resolved in the favor of 
veterans.124 On the other hand, an essential notion of Chevron is that 
Congress knows that, in general, the agency administering a statute 
should resolve ambiguity.125 
The courts can harmonize these competing notions because the 
issue of Congress’s intent is not black and white. Rather, we can think 
in terms of the degree of freedom delegated by Congress.126 The 
Supreme Court has recognized that Congress sometimes does not 
intend to delegate interpretive discretion to an agency.127 It follows 
that Congress can also delegate limited interpretive authority.128 In 
other words, Congress could afford VA some—but not full—
discretion in interpreting veterans benefits statutes, and thereby avoid 
                                                 
123 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside — An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part I, 65 STANFORD L. REV. 901 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 
STANFORD L. REV. 901 (2014). 
124 The premise of such a view of congressional intent is contingent on the 
members of Congress and their staffs having an understanding of the canons of 
interpretation applied by the courts. In practice, it seems that such understanding 
is inconsistent at best. See id. 
125 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
126 Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. at 1863. 
127 See Jellum, CAVC, supra note 51, at 98 (discussing Food & Drug Admin. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243 (2006); and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)). 
128 See Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 90. A recent, notable example of 
Congress explicitly circumscribing an agency’s interpretive authority is the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which “instruct[s] courts to apply the Skidmore deference 
factors when reviewing certain agency preemption decisions and . . . referr[s]to 
Chevron throughout.” Kent H. Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
__ (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405016. 
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causing non-delegation issues.129 As a result, Gardner should not be 
taken as necessarily mandating specific interpretations of ambiguous 
language, but as limiting those that would be otherwise permitted 
under Chevron to a smaller subset. Under this framework, veteran 
friendliness would not trump agency deference; rather, it would limit 
the field of interpretations to which the courts must defer.130 Moreover, 
courts should operate with the premise that the outcome of any 
interpretive question should be veteran friendly, but must give 
deference to VA when it chooses among plausibly veteran-friendly 
options.131 Indeed, when judicial review was enacted, the House 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs’ report on the legislation explicitly 
stated that “decisions of [VA] deserve the respect of the judicial 
branch, even when that branch views such decisions as dubious or 
unwise. It is only through such deference that the three branches of 
government can continue to coexist.”132 
The attraction of this option is that it recognizes that the question 
of veteran friendliness is often a very complex question. The design 
and operation of the system involves trade-offs between speed, 
tailoring, and costs.133 To the extent that the agency does not have 
unlimited funds, it must decide how best to allocate its finite 
resources.134 In some situations, it may choose to use easier-to-
administer, bright-line rules to speed up decision making and reduce 
inconsistent outcomes.135 In others, it may choose to create subjective 
rules to provide some discretion to adjudicators to handle complex 
                                                 
129 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 
(2000) (describing how canons of construction applicable to administrative 
agencies effectively exist as a type of nondelegation doctrine). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 H.R. REP. 100-963, at 25 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5807 
(emphasis added). 
133 Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Government Benefits and the Rule of 
Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 
499, 549 (2006) (arguing that “the CAVC has exhibited excessive tolerance for 
VA delay and error by failing to interpret its powers and VA’s mandate in ways 
that could speed decision-making and improve its accuracy”); see also Ridgway, 
Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1188–89. 
134 See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1188–89. 
135 Robert N. Davis, Veterans Fighting Wars at Home and Abroad, 45 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 389, 402–03 (2013). 
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cases and quickly evolving medical issues.136 This calculus on the part 
of the agency is not limited to just the cost of administering the 
system, but also may involve other tradeoffs.137 For example, the 
Veterans Health Administration (the medical arm of VA that primarily 
operates VA hospitals) provides over a million medical opinions each 
year in support of the Veterans Benefits Administration (the 
adjudication arm of the agency).138 Every hour devoted to these 
opinions limits the health care provided to veterans and the number of 
new veterans admitted to the health care system each year.139 
In essence, the courts apply Gardner and similar principles to 
provide a degree of value-based review that shepherds the agency into 
a box of acceptable decisions.140 Within that box, the courts conduct a 
more deferential fact-based review in a traditional Chevron model. 
This model is not novel. In fact, some argue that the Constitution 
generally requires that “legislative delegations of authority to 
government actors must contain legal standards that guide and control 
discretion.”141 The veteran-friendliness canon, then, is part of the 
legislative delegation that limits the Secretary.142 If some reasonable 
vision of veteran friendliness were interpretable from the Secretary’s 
interpretation of a statute, then it is permissible and sustainable.143 This 
approach is similar to that taken by Professor Linda Jellum in asserting 
                                                 
136 See Id. 
137 See Ridgway, Changing Voices, supra note 13, at 1188–89. 
138 See generally About, VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.va.gov/health
/aboutVHA.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (generally describing the duties and 
function of the Veterans Health Administration). 
139 To the extent that Congress is deeply involved in defining VA’s budget with 
substantial detail as to its specific allocations among numerous programs, it is a 
matter of more than just agency discretion. The ongoing involvement by 
Congress in defining the agency’s budget tends to legitimize VA’s choices in 
allocating scarce resources. 
140 See Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency 
Discretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1, 9 (2011); see also Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118. 
141 See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 133, at 501. 
142 See id. 
143 See Healy, supra note 140, at 55 (2011) (arguing that, “when an agency has 
exercised delegated lawmaking power to interpret an ambiguous statute, a 
reviewing court should review only the permissibility of the agency’s decision-
making process, rather than the agency’s substantive interpretation”). 
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that perhaps “Gardner’s presumption belongs to VA, not to the 
court,”144 but perhaps with a bit more teeth. 
The prospect of the courts explicitly adopting such an approach is 
murky. However, a recent CAVC case tends to support this view. In 
Trafter v. Shinseki,145 a panel of the court explicitly characterized 
Gardner as a limitation on Chevron, holding that the court must defer 
to the agency’s interpretations “unless . . . the Secretary’s 
interpretation is unfavorable to veterans, such that it conflicts with the 
beneficence underpinning VA’s veterans benefits scheme, and a more 
liberal construction is available that affords a harmonious interplay 
between provisions.”146 The opinion cited Gardner for this 
proposition, but not any intervening Federal Circuit or CAVC opinions 
formulating the relationship this way. 
In general, it is rare to find a veterans law opinion that explicitly 
admits that the Secretary has chosen a permissible interpretation even 
though the court disagrees with it.147 Rather, the Federal Circuit, in 
Haas v. Peake,148 rejected an analogous approach to residual 
congressional intent.149 That case dealt with ambiguous language in a 
statute about exposure of Vietnam veterans to Agent Orange.150 The 
CAVC151 and the dissenting judge at the Federal Circuit152 both argued 
                                                 
144 See Jellum, Heads I Win, supra note 24, at 120. 
145 26 Vet. App. 267 (2013). 
146 Id. at 272. 
147 One notable counter-example is a recent concurring opinion by Judge Moorman, 
in which he “reluctantly conclude[s] that the Secretary has presented a plausible, 
even though strained, alternative reading of [the regulation at issue] that 
warrants an affirmance of the Board’s decision.” Johnson v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. 
App. 237, 251 (2013) (en banc) (Moorman, J., concurring). 
148 See Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 275 (2006) (concluding that it was 
Congress’s intent that veterans “‘have their exposure claims adjudicated under 
uniform and consistent regulations that incorporate rational scientific 
judgments’” (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S13, 591 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) 
(statement of Sen. Alan Simpson))), rev’d sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 
1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
152 Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Fogel, J., dissenting) (“[I]t 
is reasonable to expect that an administrative interpretation limiting the benefits 
of the presumption at issue here would be based on at least some scientific 
evidence.”). 
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that Congress had created ambiguity in the statute but had a specific 
intent that VA resolve this ambiguity based upon scientific research 
about actual exposure.153 However, the majority of the Federal Circuit 
ignored that argument, deciding the claim based upon Auer 
deference.154 
The Federal Circuit has yet to consider the CAVC’s articulation in 
Trafter.155 Nonetheless, if someone were to present a clear articulation 
of this reconciliation of the canons to the courts, they might well find 
that it would fit comfortably within their traditional notions of review. 
However, as explored in the next two sections, more exotic approaches 
might allow for even better judicial management of the benefits 
system. 
B. The Canons and Separation of Powers 
Reference to the structural roles of Congress and agencies further 
refines the idea that the canons can coexist to guide courts in managing 
the authority delegated by Congress to VA. Pursuant to the separation 
of powers model underlying the United States government, there lies 
an obvious distinction between substance and procedure. Defining 
benefits—the monies the Treasury will pay out—is quintessentially a 
legislative function.156 Benefits tend to be defined in significant detail, 
and relatively little discretion is normally afforded to agencies. 
Congress has the power of the purse and defines when it is lawful to 
write checks;157 therefore, courts should give Congress’s intent great 
deference—compared to that of the Secretary—with regard to defining 
benefits. 
On the other hand, administering programs is the quintessential 
function of an executive agency. Congress defines its goals and may 
outline guidance as to the administration of programs, but the nitty-
gritty of turning legislative intent into actual results is what agencies 
do. Statutes such as section 501 of Title 38, which states, “The 
Secretary has authority to prescribe all rules and regulations which are 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the laws administered by the 
                                                 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. Trafter was not appealed by the 
Secretary. 
156 See 31 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
157 Id. 
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Department and are consistent with those laws,”158 embody this 
notion. Accordingly, deference to the agency would be at its maximum 
for procedural issues, where the Secretary has exercised this delegation 
of authority. 
Based on these notions, the default judicial approach would be that 
veteran friendliness should be the applicable principle when it comes 
to the definition of benefits; indeed, Gardner was such a case. On the 
other hand, Chevron/Auer deference would be the default approach in 
cases disputing the proper interpretation of procedures for 
administering the system. 
This view makes intuitive sense. Congress spends significant time 
seeking to understand veterans’ needs and adjusting the benefits 
provided to them.159 Statutes define the procedures used by VA in 
broad language, however, and include subjective terms that allow for 
much discretion. Congress engages in extensive oversight of the 
agency,160 but in reality, congressional hearings often focus on the 
adequacy of benefits and the overall performance of the agency, and 
are far less likely to delve down into the weeds of procedural 
interpretation.161 As a result, the use of the substantive/procedural 
distinction tends to align judicial review principles with the correct 
notions of the allocation of power between Congress and agencies. 
This distinction is also consistent with the fact/values distinction, 
because responsibility for veteran friendliness is more clearly 
delegated to the agency in the procedural arena than it is in the 
substantive arena. 
Nonetheless, such an approach is not a panacea. The question of 
whether a particular rule is substantive or procedural is often itself 
                                                 
158 38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012). 
159 See generally Ridgway, Splendid Isolation Revisited, supra note 97, at 194–219 
(exploring the history of veterans benefits and the role of Congress therein). 
160 In fact, one study found that “agency ‘infractions’ that are subject to 
congressional oversight are approximately 22% less likely to reoccur, compared 
to similar actions that do not receive oversight attention.” Brian D. Feinstein, 
Congressional Control of Administrative Agencies 2 (2014) (working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2304497. 
161 For a collection of significant congressional hearings on the operation of VA, 
see House Hearing Transcripts, VETERANS LAW LIBRARY (last visited Aug. 10, 
2014), available at http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/House_Hearings.html, 
and Senate Hearing Transcripts, VETERANS LAW LIBRARY (last visited Aug. 10, 
2014), available at http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/Senate_Hearings.html. 
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difficult.162 Moreover, it does not explain the current use of Gardner 
and Chevron by the courts, particularly the Federal Circuit. In a 
number of recent Federal Circuit cases, and in a complete reversal of 
the above approach, the court invoked agency deference to narrowly 
interpret veterans benefits. In Haas v. Peake,163 for example, the 
Federal Circuit invoked Auer deference to narrowly interpret which 
groups of veterans were entitled to benefits based upon presumptive 
exposure to Agent Orange.164 On the other hand, the court in Rivera v. 
Shinseki165 invoked the sympathetic reading doctrine to rule against 
the government on a procedural issue,166 without mentioning agency 
deference at all. A move toward the procedure/substance distinction 
would, therefore, represent a significant change of approach by the 
courts. 
C. The Canons and Court Review 
Although the above approaches focus on the relationship between 
Congress and VA, another approach is to turn the focus to the role of 
the courts. Any reconciliation of veteran friendliness and agency 
deference will continue to require courts to evaluate the effects of 
agency decisions.167 In creating judicial review of veterans claims, 
Congress clearly intended to establish the courts not just as arbiters of 
disputes, but also as stewards of the system that would critically 
review the agency’s interpretations of law and thereby help increase 
public confidence in the system’s operation.168 Fulfilling this role by 
                                                 
162 See Karen Petroski, Statutory Genres: Substance, Procedure, Jurisdiction, 44 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 196–97 (2012). 
163 See 525 F.3d 1168, 1186–90 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
164 Id. at 1199. 
165 See 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
166 Id. at 1380. 
167 See generally Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: 
Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35, 35–36 (1992) (discussing the 
conflict that although federal courts have the authority to independently 
determine the meaning of statutory provisions, they are required to defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own governing statute and 
regulation pursuant to the “deference rule”). 
168 See H.R. REP. 100-963, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 
5808 (noting that “the creation of a court is intended to provide a more 
independent review by a body which is not bound by the [VA]’s view of the 
law, and that will be more clearly perceived as one which has as its sole function 
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peeking under the policy hood to determine whether VA’s choices are 
veteran friendly, however, is often quite challenging in practice. The 
courts can conduct a sophisticated analysis of what is veteran friendly 
only if they have the necessary information to do so. 
Opposing sides invoke the doctrines of veteran friendliness and 
deference, respectively, most often when the agency is advocating for 
a position that, while unspoken, is intentionally unfriendly to veterans. 
This is a suspect proposition, however. The individual values of 
agency employees often strongly align with the agency’s mission, and, 
arguably, agency employees are often in a better position to 
understand the best way to advance those values.169 Certainly, in 
recent decades it is quite challenging to find either public statements 
from agency officials, agency commentary on proposed legislation, or 
Federal Register statements on regulation changes that express 
anything other than a desire to make the system work well for 
veterans.170 Furthermore, a substantial portion of VA staff and 
leadership themselves are veterans and have past experience working 
for veterans service organizations.171 Accordingly, it is simply 
unrealistic to believe that VA routinely sets out to take veteran-
unfriendly positions. Clearly, determinations about whether the 
agency’s position is truly unfriendly, and if so, how it came to be, tend 
to be very complicated. 
It is entirely possible for the agency to take a veteran-unfriendly 
position, as agencies operate through human beings. Public choice 
                                                                                                                   
deciding claims in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States”). 
169 See Peter M. Shane, The Rule of Law and the Inevitability of Discretion, 36 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 24–25 (2013) (arguing that agencies are better 
structured than Congress to faithfully and consistently advance policy values). 
170 See Core Characteristics, 38 C.F.R. § 0.602 (2012) (defining the core 
characteristics of VA as an organization, which are focused on making the 
system work best for veterans); see also Core Values, 38 C.F.R. § 0.601 (2012) 
(defining the core values for VA employees, which establish VA as a veteran-
centric agency). 
171 See, e.g., VA Claims System: Review of VA’s Transformation Progress: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 113th Cong. (Dec. 11, 2013), 
available at http://www.veterans.senate.gov/hearings/va-claims-system-review-
of-vas-transformation-progress (testimony of Allison A. Hickey, Under 
Secretary for Benefits, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs) (noting that over half of the 
employees of the Veterans Benefits Administration are veterans). 
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theory172 and bounded rationality theory173 predict that agency actors 
will sometimes make less-than-ideal choices for reasons both 
conscious and unconscious. In many cases, however, the agency’s 
objection to a claimant’s proposed “veteran-friendly” interpretation is 
that the agency has a different view of which interpretation would lead 
to the most veteran-friendly outcome across the entire system.174 Other 
times, the agency’s view is that the cost in time or money of accepting 
a particular “veteran-friendly” rule is simply too high, given the finite 
budget provided by Congress.175 Litigation often involves statutes or 
regulations that are decades old and no longer operate as intended due 
to changed circumstances.176 In such situations, the grounds for the 
government’s opposition may be that the proper remedy is new 
legislation or regulations, rather than adopting a strained interpretation. 
Furthermore, one of the defining attributes of complex systems is that 
it is very hard to accurately predict the effect of changes ex ante.177 In 
such situations, the basis of VA’s position may turn upon an honest 
misjudgment of the effect it would have in practice. Consequently, 
substantial information and context is often necessary for the courts to 
accurately analyze competing claims about whether a policy is veteran 
friendly or goes beyond the discretion of the agency. 
Given the complexity of the problems, Gardner, Hodge, Chevron, 
and related cases may benefit the system more if used as litigation 
burdens. Acceptance of congressional intent in creating judicial review 
of veterans claims includes both agency deference178 and veteran 
                                                 
172 Public choice theory holds that government officials responding to their personal 
incentives—such as getting promoted or reelected—will not always act in ways 
that produce optimal results for the public. See, e.g., Ridgway, Equitable Power, 
supra note 103, at 130–31. 
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friendliness.179 Aggressively encouraging both parties to make a well-
supported case as to how their interpretations are consistent with the 
values of agency deference and veteran friendliness would best serve 
the role of the courts. In other words, the courts should not treat either 
one of these values as heuristics that greatly simplify decision making 
when invoked.180 Rather, these are guidelines for persuasive arguments 
to the courts based upon congressionally entrusted, assessable 
interests. As a result, the canons place the burden on the parties to 
develop and support their arguments with a vision of how the system 
would be of service to veterans. 
What might this look like in practice? The courts could make clear 
that the applicability of the canons in any case is dependent upon the 
overall strength of the arguments on a systemic level. A claimant 
should base his or her argument for veteran friendliness upon more 
than just the outcome of the case at hand. Rather, the argument should 
detail how the alternative interpretation being advanced produces more 
veteran-friendly outcomes overall, without infringing on the primary 
role of the democratic branches, which is making difficult judgments 
about budgeting and resource allocation. Similarly, the agency should 
base its argument for deference upon more than the mere fact that it 
has already made an interpretation. It should explain the systemic 
considerations and policy judgments that went into the interpretation 
to which the courts owe deference. In other words, the strength of the 
canons are not tied to a rigid ex ante hierarchy, but to the advocates’ 
ability to make compelling arguments about how the advanced 
positions promote veteran friendliness while also respecting agency 
deference. 
A key benefit of this approach is to create more informed court 
decisions by incentivizing both sides to develop the necessary 
information to make difficult judgments regarding rules that affect the 
operation of the system. Engaging the energy of the advocates on both 
sides is critical because obtaining information from large institutions, 
or about how such institutions function, is an inherently difficult 
                                                 
179 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
180 See James D. Ridgway, The Behavioral Psychology of Appellate Persuasion, 1 
STETSON J. ADVOC. & L. 67, 74 (2014), available at http://www2
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problem.181 Furthermore, serious problems can occur when a court 
misunderstands the operation of a system that it is attempting to 
guide.182 Indeed, there have been multiple occasions when the CAVC 
has declined to take Federal Circuit decisions at face value due the 
decisions’ overlooked, veteran-unfriendly consequences.183 
Accordingly, there would be a tremendous benefit from the courts 
incentivizing the parties to find and present detailed information and 
analyses of systemic effects.184 
Perhaps a detailed review of cases may show that the quality of 
argument already has a strong bearing on which canon the courts rely. 
There are a number of additional advantages from the courts explicitly 
announcing that the force to be accorded to each of the canons in a 
given case depends upon how well developed the argument is 
                                                 
181 See RUSSELL HARDIN, HOW DO YOU KNOW?: THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY 
KNOWLEDGE 121–34 (2009) (discussing the difficulties in assessing institutional 
knowledge). 
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comprehensive guide to the system. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL (Barton 
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advocates on both sides to research and analyze information for the courts. 
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taking judicial notice of the operation of the system. See Kyhn v. Shinseki, 716 
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supporting its application.185 First, the likelihood that the parties will 
submit the information needed will greatly improve the courts’ ability 
to make fully informed decisions, particularly when there is no 
ambiguity that such information is essential to the courts’ analysis. 
Perhaps more importantly, it may open the door for the courts to adopt 
an explicit doctrine that they will abstain from making far reaching 
interpretative decisions when it appears that the parties have 
insufficiently explored the relevant issues. Of course, it would still be 
necessary for individual cases to be resolved. Nevertheless, courts may 
handle difficult cases with opinions that reserve judgment on 
interpretative issues and instead provide guidance on issues courts 
need to understand in the future before they would be comfortable 
making definitive rulings. 
Furthermore, if properly executed, such a doctrine could benefit 
veterans by dramatically improving the dialogue between the courts 
and the parties. In many situations, the Secretary and experienced 
veterans advocates have far superior access than the courts to 
information on the benefits system. Drawing this information out in 
the course of litigation would not only produce better, more clearly 
reasoned decisions, but also improve public understanding of the 
system. Over time, such review would: (1) make the operation of the 
system more transparent; (2) encourage making key data easily 
accessible, either by VA itself or by service organizations wielding 
Freedom of Information Act requests; and (3) make veterans law more 
attractive to academics and independent think tanks looking for areas 
in which their work might receive public recognition. 
Finally, such an approach would reconcile the fact-based and 
value-based approaches to judicial review by recognizing that, in 
passing the VJRA, Congress explicitly intended that judicial review 
recognize both veteran friendliness and agency deference as core 
values. Accordingly, courts would not resolve complex cases by 
treating either principle as a trump card, but by carefully examining 
how the system would operate under each of the alternative 
                                                 
185 A possible objection to this approach is that agency deference would operate 
differently than it does in the traditional Chevron framework. However, this is 
not a doctrinal problem because recent case law makes clear that specific 
congressional intent regarding agency deference in a particular area can trump 
the default rules. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is hard 
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interpretations being advanced. In this regard, such an approach would 
advance the ultimate goal of Congress in bringing judicial review to 
veterans benefits and ensuring the delivery of the best possible benefits 
system for veterans and their families. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Veterans law is distinctly different from most other areas of law. In 
almost every other area of law, deep divisions are caused by 
profoundly different worldviews between the parties. For example, in 
areas of law such as environmental, antitrust, labor, election, 
discrimination, or religious-liberty, two or more distinct ideologies 
advocate for wholly different and often incompatible agendas.186 
Veterans law is special, if not unique, in that essentially everyone 
who practices it shares a basic vision of a veteran-friendly system in 
which claimants receive substantial assistance in filing claims that are 
adjudicated quickly, accurately, and fairly. Those who represent 
veterans often forego more lucrative careers in other areas of the law 
to help their clients.187 Although government attorneys oppose 
claimants in many appeals to the courts,188 their goal is not to deny 
benefits, but to preserve the Secretary’s view of how best to operate 
the system in the interest of all veterans.189 The challenge for judges, 
practitioners, and policymakers is that, for countless issues, it is very 
difficult to see how the various choices will affect speed, accuracy, 
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and claimants’ ability to participate in the process, much less make 
judgments about the veteran-friendliness of the tradeoffs presented.190 
The long-term solution to making the system more veteran friendly 
is to scrap the current Rube Goldberg-like process that has 
accumulated over decades, and replace it with a more streamlined 
process that has a coherent, end-to-end vision balancing many 
competing values. In the meantime, the courts need to work toward a 
concept of judicial review that produces clear, useful guidance as to 
how the system should operate. The cornerstone of this effort will be 
developing a more sophisticated concept of how to balance the ideals 
embodied by Gardner and Chevron. 
There are a number of possible paths to take. In the end, the 
different approaches may be pieces of the same puzzle, rather than 
alternatives. No approach will guide the system toward better results, 
however, unless it recognizes that veteran friendliness and deference to 
the Secretary are not antithetical. Instead, they can operate together to 
demand more of both advocates and VA in presenting a coherent 
vision to the courts. This will occur, however, only if the courts 
themselves both articulate guidance as to how these principles interact 
and require both sides to take these principles seriously in their 
advocacy. 
Ultimately, the courts should not fear the evolution of the canons 
of veteran friendliness and agency deference. As Judge Posner 
observed, “[o]ld rules sometimes accrete new rationales as the original 
rationales fall to changed circumstances.”191 Although the opposing 
sides before the courts are adversaries in one technical sense, neither 
intends to oppose the best interests of veterans. Accordingly, the courts 
should foster a constructive relationship between VA and veterans’ 
representatives, by pushing both sides to do a better job of articulating 
how their positions are part of a larger vision of a veteran-friendly 
system. Only by elevating the conversation can we hope to tame the 
complexity of the current process and avoid the unintended delays and 
frustrations that cause so many to believe that the system has lost its 
way. 
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